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achievement of postal (and customs) censorship. They have assembled
and organized facts which were heretofore largely obscure, and they
have permitted the facts to generate the extremely difficult questions
to which the community must now seek answers: What do we really
know about the impact of sexually arousing words, or pictures? What
groups need shielding from the impact of what kinds of communications? What sorts of sanctions, selectively fashioned and applied, best
lend themselves to the exact tasks to be accomplished? How can we
protect the nation against that wholesale antisepticizing of communication which would sterilize and stultify free speech and the arts?
Are the judgments involved, and the modes of administration to be
utilized, ones which should be fashioned nationally, or locally, or at
many levels of official action? The Paul-Schwartz book gives us a concrete basis for beginning the hard and necessary job of tackling these
questions, and many more.
Louis H. POLLAK *

SELECTED PAPERS OF FELix S. COHEN.'
Edited by Lucy Kramer Cohen. New Haven: Yale University Press.
196o. Pp. xvii, 505. $12.50.
This collection of Felix Cohen's papers, including twenty-seven articles and talks and seventeen book reviews, is at once a memorial to a
dedicated and skilled scholar and lawyer and a valuable commentary
on the relationships between philosophy, ethics, law, and the world of
practical affairs. Written between 1929 and 1953, and addressed to different audiences, the papers necessarily reflect changing moods and
points of view; nevertheless, taken together they constitute a coherent
approach to law.
Felix Cohen was at home in philosophy. He was trained to think of
philosophical systems as being translatable from one to the other. In
a 1949 address on "Law and Language" (p. iii) he attributed to Professor Sheffer of Harvard the development of the idea "of a formula
of translation through which a statement, true in one system, may be
translated into a statement in another system that sounds quite different but that means the same thing" (p. iig). The recognition that
truth may be expressed in different languages, that two philosophers
using the same symbols may mean different things (p. iio), and that
"legal philosophy is not a bad play in which each actor clears the stage
by killing off his predecessors" (p. i54) helped to focus attention on
the functional role of concepts. He was concerned with the context in
which concepts were used, and with their usefulness in organizing inquiry. In his significant article, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach" (p. 33), published in 1935, the thrust of the criticism
THE LEGAL CONSCIENCE:

* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.

1907-53, Late Lecturer in Law, Yale University
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was against "concepts which are not defined either in terms of empirical
fact or in terms of ethics but which are used to answer empirical and
ethical questions alike, and thus bar the way to intelligent investigation of social fact and social policy" (p. 45). The manipulation of
unverifiable concepts, which could not be translated into terms of actual
experience, had led, in his view, to a preoccupation with pseudo-problems, such as "what is the holding or ratio decidendi of a case?" or
"where is a corporation?" which served "only as invitations to equally
meaningless displays of conceptual acrobatics" (p. 49).
Cohen was interested in the living law, which "can be found in the
contracts men make, written and unwritten, in the written or unwritten
constitutions of the various associations in which people function, from
the family to the modern business corporation, in the actual legal relationships and institutions that make up the social order" (pp. i8ggo). He was concerned with the consequences of legal rules - consequences which would have to be understood in the light of all relevant
knowledge. In the field of legal criticism, the functional method was
essentially "a reorientation of utilitarianism to a wider philosophical perspective and to a broader horizon of relevant knowledge in the fields
of psychology, economics, criminology and general sociology" (p. 94).
He knew that sociological jurisprudence in 1933 remained "in large part
a pious program rather than a record of achievement" (p. 181). But
as early as 1935 he thought the age of the classical jurist was over;
future creative scholars would not devote themselves to the taxonomy
of legal concepts but rather would "look . . . to the actual facts of
judicial behavior," would "make increasing use of statistical methods
in the scientific description and prediction of judicial behavior," and
would "more and more seek to map the hidden springs of judicial decision and to weigh the social forces which are represented on the bench"
(pp. 59-6o). He was critical of that realistic jurisprudence which was
content to regard each judicial decision as a discrete event- an expression of individual personality- and which did not realize that
every decision was "a product of social determinants and an index of
social consequences" (p. 70). By 195o he was able to give greater
content and direction to his view of what would constitute a meaningful study of judicial decisions within their social context by formulating
these hypotheses:
i. The more reprehensible the conduct, the more readily will judges find
a causal connection between the conduct and the injury complained of.
2. The more hateful the defendant, the more readily will judges find a
causal connection between the defendant and the injury complained of.
3. A judgment against a highly respected person has a larger precedent
value than a judgment against a despised person; conversely, a judgment in favor of a despised person has a larger precedent value than one
for a pillar of society. 4. A value differential in attitude of judge and
jury towards a given class will be reflected in differences of judgment
as to whether individuals of the given class are responsible for the
wrongs complained of (p. 144).

1688

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

Felix Cohen joined his interest as a philosopher and lawyer in the
relationship of ethics to law with his zeal as a social reformer. Ethics
represented that wisdom which would make possible appropriate conscious choices in the inevitable leeways of the law. He was insistent
that the choice among precedents required an appraisal in ethical terms,
even though he was scornful of the scholar who would "muddy his descriptions of judicial behavior with wishful thinking" and who, therefore, would conclude, "this cannot be the law because it is contrary to
sound principle" rather than "this rule leads to the following results,
which are socially undesirable for the following reasons" (p. 68). He
was critical of "a belief that law can attain the prestige of science only
by showing a thorough contempt for judgments of value" (p. ig).
"What moral a court ought to draw from past cases is always a moral
question. It is the function of ethics to bring to bear upon such questions a sound sense of human values" (p. 26). In the suppressed moral
premises of judicial opinions, in the choices made between competing
interpretations of fact, in the selection of value-charged words, in the
tracing of lines of causation, "we find prime indicators of the value
patterns of a judge, a judiciary, or a society" (p. i5i). Modern ethics
brings to the problems of law "the full wealth of human wisdom ....
To know the limits of past knowledge is the needed prelude to useful

research" (p.

32).

A criterion of values was required. No unified science and no inference was possible on the basis of individual cases alone (p. x6).
"Dean Pound has talked for many years of the 'balancing' of interests,
but without ever indicating . . . how a standard of weight or fineness
can be constructed for the appraisal of 'interests'" (p. 76). Modern
ethics, renouncing the pretense of mystic learning, using the methods
and data of science, would have "to build up moral rules . . . by testing every moral rule against moral judgments upon concrete cases, and
by fitting every moral judgment into its proper context of social facts"
(p. 29). It would proceed through casuistry which we "now call the
case method" (p. 112). In a world of collapsing faiths, a new philosophy of values would have to be molded; "no civilization can endure
which distrusts its moral foundations as profoundly as we have come
to distrust the ideals that order our social existence" (p. 338). Max
Radin's retreat "from the intellectual outposts of legal reform" by
delimiting the purpose of law as less than "to secure a good society"
brought the sorrowful comment in 1941: "One may . . . hope that
the conditions which make this exposition worth reading will soon pass
away" (p. 199).
A great deal of Felix Cohen's time and effort as a lawyer both in
and out of government was spent on Indian affairs, and the most eloquent essays in the volume deal with the position of the Indian. To
Felix Cohen the Indian tribe in America was as "the miners' canary
and when it flutters and droops we know that the poison gases of intolerance threaten all other minorities in our land" (pp. 313-14). The
distinctive political ideals of American life had emerged "out of a rich
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Indian democratic tradition" (p. 317). Again and again Felix Cohen
emphasizes that "we owe to the Indian many of our sports, recreations,
highways, drugs, food habits, and political institutions, and most of
our agricultural staples" (p. 291). And we are reminded repeatedly
that many of the contributions "had to meet suspicion and hostility
before they won professional and public acceptance" (p. 262).
The treatment of Indian claims in judicial opinions illustrated for
Felix Cohen the effect of value judgments on fact or law determinations, for "a white man 'travels' or 'commutes"' while "an Indian
(like a buffalo) 'roams.' A white man may be of 'mixed ancestry,' an
Indian (or a cow) is a 'mixed breed'" (pp. 149-50). Cohen was fascinated, appalled and indignant at the misconceptions concerning the
Indian; as, for example, the legend that Indians are not citizens (pp.
232, 328, 463); or the view, ascribed to Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the Northwest Shoshone case,2 "that Indians were really
communists, who did not understand or appreciate property rights"
(p. 163). "It is safe to say," Felix Cohen writes, "that in every Indian
tribe some individual interest and some social obligations are attached
to the land" (p. 219). "Again, in dealing with our problem of rural
land tenure in the United States, I think we shall make much greater
progress if, instead of seeking to impose the worship of the fee simple
absolute upon the Indians we adapt to white use some of the basic
principles of Indian land tenure" (p. 260).
Felix Cohen was ambivalent in his description of the American treatment of the Indian. "It is a striking fact that so often in the history
of Spain, Spanish-America, and the United States, oppression of Indians has come from local neighbors and officials and help has come
from a far-off central government. Perhaps it is easier for legal ideals
to live in a place far enough from the facts to which they are applied
so that perspective in judgment is possible and long-range values are
not sacrificed to immediate, petty advantages" (p. 245). The Indian
claims were "the backwash of a great national experiment in dictatorship and racial extermination," particularly in the period from the close
of the Civil War to the First World War (p. 265). Yet approximately
$8oo million of federal funds had been appropriated for the purchase
of Indian lands - "not a common occurrence in the world's history"
(p. 291). In 1942 Felix Cohen wrote, "those who will build a better
postwar world can well afford to ponder the legal relationship of American Indians to the Federal Government, which, after three centuries of
experience and experimentation, often bitter, conforms more closely
today than ever before to the humane legal ideals first formulated by
the theological jurisprudence of sixteenth-century Spain" (p. 252).
The recognition of tribal self-government and the legal equality of the
races would be relevant in many areas where the problem would be to
preserve the rights and liberties of native groups while permitting the
fullest development of the world's resources (p. 251-52).
'Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 357
(1945).
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Felix Cohen's view of the Indian in American political life reflected
and no doubt influenced his jurisprudential ideas. Activity which might
symbolize specific values in one culture had a different meaning under
other circumstances. The inefficiency of Indian self-government symbolized the mark of respect for the individual and, not paradoxically,
for group values, which reflected Felix Cohen's distaste for overbearing
agents or experts of the Indian office and his view that some kind of
socialism might provide the basis for a more meaningful ethics. These
views found expression in a rather strange attack on Ernst Freund
and other graduates of the University of Berlin for wishing to confer
increased powers upon executive or administrative agencies (p. 366)
and an intemperate review of Lippmann's The Good Society not quite
characteristic of one who could see good through translation in most
philosophical systems. Felix Cohen's experience with the practical
seems also to have modified somewhat his view of the shape of intellectual rigor. The essays begin appropriately with a 1929 philosophical
essay on "What is a Question?" Significant questions at that period
of Felix Cohen's development were only those to which one true proposition, and one only, would be the correct answer. An ambiguous question would not be "in the logical sense, a question at all" (p. ii). By
1g5o, he reminds us that "lawyers . . . have special opportunities to
learn what many logicians have not yet recognized: that truth on earth
is a matter of degree . . ." He then quotes Whitehead as saying, "We
shall meet propositions in Heaven" and explains that Whitehead meant
that "the symbolism of terrestrial life is too fuzzy ever to reach an
absolute precision, so that unambiguousness is an ideal rather than an
attainable fact" (p. 122). To be sure, Whitehead was quoted to the
same effect in the 1929 essay, but there Cohen responded with a defense
of "the divine task of the logician" (p. 12).
Two heroes, one implicit and one explicit, dominate these essays: one
is Morris Cohen, Felix Cohen's father, whose skillful, precise and
skeptical approach to matters of legal philosophy is capably and creatively reflected in these writings. The second is Francisco Vitoria,
professor of moral theology at the University of Salamanca in the sixteenth century and courageous defender of Indian rights, to whom repeated reference is made as the real father of international law. To some
extent these two heroes represent the fortunate union of philosophy and
action underlying the essays.
The unity underlying these writings is not at once apparent - a difficulty perhaps inherent in most collections of separate essays. There
is an added difficulty for the modern reader, who will easily catch the
flavor of the jurisprudential ground-breakers of the 193o's, and whose
mind is apt to wander away to more melancholy thoughts of how little
progress has been made upon the suggested new lines of approach. The
four hypotheses set forth in Felix Cohen's 195o article remain almost
in advance of the work which has been done. For some readers the
answer to the implied question of the meaning of this lack of progress
will be found in the more traditional values of the lawyer as public
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servant and defender of moral values as exemplified in the essays on
Indian affairs and on American democracy. The occasional disappointment that some of these later essays, which are action oriented, do not
quite reflect the hard skepticism of the philosopher and the careful
posing of issues is in itself a recognition of the power and breadth of
this distinguished legal philosopher and lawyer.
EDWARD H. LEVI *

THE

TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABIL-

By Arno C. Becht I and Frank W. Miller. 2 St. Louis:
Washington University Studies. ig6i. Pp. vi, 224. $4.5o.
The authors of this work have courageously explored a field lying
between philosophy and law which until recently has been only skirted
by legal writers. This is the field denoted by the question: In law
what causes are causes in fact? The authors distinguish this sharply
from questions of policy and value, which they classify as "liability
limitations" and exclude from their book. Lawyers have traditionally
run the two areas together, though they sometimes pretend that they
do not. This reviewer, as a first-semester law student, had a course
called Legal Liability planned by Professor Joseph H. Beale. It was
supposed to be a completely rational, or at least rationalized, study of
proximate causation, and was intended to fit all aspects of all cases,
whether they arose in a torts, criminal law, measure of contract damages,
or other context.3 At the opposite pole, eschewing formulas, Leon
Green undertook to reduce causation to a minimum factual role and to
identify the major problems as ones of social valuation: Who ought
to bear the risks inherent in a situation? 4 Most of the talk in all this
was about negligence cases. It was assumed that for a plaintiff to recover
he had to prove three things. The first was negligence in the defendant,
the third was injury to himself, and the second was whatever connected the first to the third. The handiest name for this relational
element in the middle, and just about the most misleading, was "proximate causation." The Restatement of Torts,5 with Judge Cardozo's
help,0 tried to divide the relational element into intelligible parts by
putting most of the policy-value portion under the title "duty" and by
ITY CASES.

* Dean of the Law School, University of Chicago.
1 Professor of Law, Washington University.
2

Professor of Law, Washington University.
casebook was BEALE, CASES ON LEGAL LIABITy (2d ed. 1920), and the
reviewer's class may have been the last one to use it. The systematic study that
went with the casebook was Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33
'The

HIARv. L. REv. 633

(X920).
SGREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXI-ATE CAUSE (1927).
RESTATEMIENT, TORTS, §§ 430-33 (i934), as amended, §§ 430, 433 (Supp. 1948).

8 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) ; cf. Overseas
Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'r Co., [ig6i] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (N.S.W.),

which overturned In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 56o (CA.).

